Keep Presentation Authority Local, Keep Recovery Sovereign

A sovereign remote HSM service is a defensible place to hold wallet signing keys: it centralises policy enforcement, constrains key custody and simplifies controlled recovery. This decision record nevertheless rejects making that service mandatory for every credential presentation. The deciding failure is a network partition between the wallet and the sovereign service, which regional HSM redundancy cannot resolve.

What the remote service gets right

The rejected option places holder signing operations in a sovereign HSM service and authenticates each wallet before authorising key use. It offers consistent cryptographic enforcement across heterogeneous devices, concentrates operational evidence within a controlled jurisdiction and avoids making every supported handset an equivalent security boundary. The European identity wallet trust architecture explicitly accommodates remote and local secure cryptographic devices, so locality alone does not establish conformity or assurance, as described in the Architecture and Reference Framework. Its availability limitation is structural: when the wallet cannot reach the service, an otherwise valid credential cannot produce fresh holder evidence, regardless of how many healthy HSMs remain behind the unreachable endpoint.

The boundary we choose

The proposed architecture keeps holder keys in an approved local secure cryptographic device and assigns issuance, enrolment authorisation and recovery approval to sovereign HSM services. Credential binding must identify the locally protected key, while each presentation must bind holder evidence to the verifier challenge and transaction context; the application must not be able to substitute an arbitrary software key. Hardware attestation establishes evidence about that key and its execution boundary during enrolment, but does not by itself prove the truth of credential attributes or authorise subsequent transactions. A decentralised identifier can reference a verification method, but neither identifier resolution nor a zero-knowledge proof establishes hardware custody unless the verification protocol explicitly binds that evidence to the protected key. The practical cost is a narrower supported device population and a recovery process based on credential reissuance, because copying the holder secret into the remote service would undermine the custody boundary this decision is intended to preserve.

Continuity ends at stale trust

During the partition, permit only explicitly eligible presentations whose authenticated status and trust evidence is no older than a proposed acceptance limit of 15 minutes, measured against a trustworthy verifier clock, and stop when that evidence expires.

The condition that reverses the decision

That freshness limit is an application policy, not a standards allowance: it accepts a bounded interval during which a newly revoked credential might still be accepted, and any applicable requirement for current status overrides it. The verifier must already possess the issuer chain, relevant trust material and verifiable status evidence, with expiry evaluated from authenticated timestamps rather than from the time a cache entry was downloaded. Recovery remains unavailable through the partition, and restoration must issue credentials bound to a newly authorised holder key while retiring the previous binding through the credential lifecycle; a restored wallet database is not sufficient authority to resume signing. The reusable decision rule is to choose local presentation authority only when the complete verification path can operate within an explicitly accepted freshness window and the required device assurance is achievable. We would choose the remote HSM option if the supported transactions required an online authority decision for every presentation, because local signing would then add custody and recovery complexity without preserving transaction availability. Before design freeze, the acceptance exercise must isolate the wallet from the sovereign service and demonstrate both a permitted presentation within the freshness window and rejection after its expiry, making the remaining revocation exposure an explicit product commitment.

Back to IdHSM · Domains

← Back to IdHSM
Engineering & Architecture Brief

Keep Presentation Authority Local, Keep Recovery Sovereign

A sovereign remote HSM service is a defensible place to hold wallet signing keys: it centralises policy enforcement, constrains key custody and simplifies controlled recovery. This decision record nevertheless rejects making that service mandatory for every credential presentation. The deciding failure is a network partition between the wallet and the sovereign service, which regional HSM redundancy cannot resolve.

What the remote service gets right

The rejected option places holder signing operations in a sovereign HSM service and authenticates each wallet before authorising key use. It offers consistent cryptographic enforcement across heterogeneous devices, concentrates operational evidence within a controlled jurisdiction and avoids making every supported handset an equivalent security boundary. The European identity wallet trust architecture explicitly accommodates remote and local secure cryptographic devices, so locality alone does not establish conformity or assurance, as described in the Architecture and Reference Framework. Its availability limitation is structural: when the wallet cannot reach the service, an otherwise valid credential cannot produce fresh holder evidence, regardless of how many healthy HSMs remain behind the unreachable endpoint.

The boundary we choose

The proposed architecture keeps holder keys in an approved local secure cryptographic device and assigns issuance, enrolment authorisation and recovery approval to sovereign HSM services. Credential binding must identify the locally protected key, while each presentation must bind holder evidence to the verifier challenge and transaction context; the application must not be able to substitute an arbitrary software key. Hardware attestation establishes evidence about that key and its execution boundary during enrolment, but does not by itself prove the truth of credential attributes or authorise subsequent transactions. A decentralised identifier can reference a verification method, but neither identifier resolution nor a zero-knowledge proof establishes hardware custody unless the verification protocol explicitly binds that evidence to the protected key. The practical cost is a narrower supported device population and a recovery process based on credential reissuance, because copying the holder secret into the remote service would undermine the custody boundary this decision is intended to preserve.

Continuity ends at stale trust

During the partition, permit only explicitly eligible presentations whose authenticated status and trust evidence is no older than a proposed acceptance limit of 15 minutes, measured against a trustworthy verifier clock, and stop when that evidence expires.

The condition that reverses the decision

That freshness limit is an application policy, not a standards allowance: it accepts a bounded interval during which a newly revoked credential might still be accepted, and any applicable requirement for current status overrides it. The verifier must already possess the issuer chain, relevant trust material and verifiable status evidence, with expiry evaluated from authenticated timestamps rather than from the time a cache entry was downloaded. Recovery remains unavailable through the partition, and restoration must issue credentials bound to a newly authorised holder key while retiring the previous binding through the credential lifecycle; a restored wallet database is not sufficient authority to resume signing. The reusable decision rule is to choose local presentation authority only when the complete verification path can operate within an explicitly accepted freshness window and the required device assurance is achievable. We would choose the remote HSM option if the supported transactions required an online authority decision for every presentation, because local signing would then add custody and recovery complexity without preserving transaction availability. Before design freeze, the acceptance exercise must isolate the wallet from the sovereign service and demonstrate both a permitted presentation within the freshness window and rejection after its expiry, making the remaining revocation exposure an explicit product commitment.

Related Architecture Specifications (HSM): lanhsm.com · payhsm.com · telecomhsm.com

More Technical Articles on idhsm.com

Sovereign Digital Identity on Silicon: Implementing eIDAS 2.0 ARF and W3C Verifiable Credentials in Hardware →Zero-Knowledge Selective Disclosure: Hardware Coprocessors for SD-JWT-VC and BBS+ Signatures →